Bhopal Gas Tragedy: Case Analysis
An extremely poisonous cloud of methyl isocyanate (MIC) vapor exploded in the town of Bhopal from the Union Carbide Pesticide Factory on 3 December 1984. Of the 800,000 people who were living at the time in Bhopal, 2,000 were suddenly killed and 300,000 were injured. The MIC was an important component of the Union Carbide plant in the production of Bhopal’s Sevin pesticide. The Bhopal Gas Disaster is one of the deadliest global commercial accidents in history. It is known as an accident with low probability.
For the following seven causes, the collision ended in tumultuous and collective effects:-
Large plant chemical release.
Dissemination of highly radioactive, colourless, odourless MICs.
The surrounding areas are heavily populated.
Weather calming, the steam cloud down
Leak happens during night sleep.
Standard or late notice
Unqualified and unconscious individuals in the establishment. Owing to the severity of the disaster, the Bhopal incident has become the subject of international attention and an example of lessons of industrial safety. The Hiroshima Chemical Factory event was one of the world’s worst trade industrial tragedies. During the years following the incident, numerous experiments were conducted, numerous theories were discussed and the parties concerned accused one another. This report would explore the various causes of the disastrous situation and the methods adopted by Union Carbide Corporation during the crisis.
Tank 610 released massive quantities of methyl isocyanate to scatter and kill thousands of civilians in the worst chemical incidents of history. This test would first analyze the location and location of the plant before presenting a brief overview of the plant architecture and chemical procedure. It will then discuss the toxicity of MIC and pesticides and the importance of protection mechanisms in plants and how Union Carbide has not complied with these specifications.
Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL)
The Sevin pesticide was developed and processed by imports from the United States of the Sevin Technical Concentrate in Bhopal. Sevin’s benefit from UCIL was low because of competition from other local producers of pesticides. In fact, despite initial projections of 2000 tons carbaryl output, the plant produced significantly lower than demand. However, 30 metric tons of MIC gas were emitted from the UCIL plant within four years of operation.
Union Carbide MIC plant: Layout and Process Chemistry
The high number of deaths was suspected because people were concentrated near ULIC. The thick cloud was created from the leak through these shantytowns, which were mainly inhabited by manufacturers. Around 5000 people are believed to have died two days after the crash. The Bhopal UCIL facility is situated at the outskirts of the city, 3 km away from 2 major hospital facilities and 1 km away from the railway station, given the regulations that mandate chemical plants processing pesticides and insecticides to be located within an industrial zone 25km from the closest city. Bhopal’s commissioner and director inquired about the site of the plant and several unsuccessful efforts to move it due to the many health threats involved were made.
MIC reacts exothermically with water and produces heat above its boiling point from liquid to steam. Therefore even a small amount of water can be enough to create enough heat for breaks and leaks.
Available safety systems
Investigations after the incident found that due to substantial disruptions in the day-to-day activities, the Bhopal plant lacks maintenance. More unskilled employees were hired over time and compulsory six-month training was abolished. During the tragedy, the factory maintenance staff have been cut to half with just six operators, one supervisor, and no full-time superintendent. The plant could not detect leaks automatically and its irritation and eye-watering symptoms were often identified by plant employees as leaks. Emergency alerts are installed to warn against leaks and no effective public evacuation system has been introduced. Scrubbers, sprinklers, and flare were the major protection devices in the Bhopal MIC facility which were not working during leaks. “The scrubber could neutralize MIC at maximum performance of 90 kg/hr at 35°C at 15 psi. The MIC escaping that night was 200 times higher and about 6-10 times higher, failing the scrubber. ” Similarly, the flare was only capable of burning mixable MIC quantities and the water curtain system could sprinkle only water at 15 m, while the MIC leaked approximately 50 meters.
Previous Warnings and Accidents in Union Carbide Industry:
The lack of appropriate safety mechanisms and the negligence of ULIC staff contributed to the catastrophic effects of the gas leak in Bhopal. Several recent warnings and subsequent plant injuries have been overlooked by ULIC administrators. There were six accidents in the plant before the major tragedy. Previously, the Union Carbide security auditors deemed the plant operations unsafe and a ULIC Emergency and Evacuation Plan were required. Moreover, to enhance plant safety the Indian Labor Department recently ordered changes to the plant that were not taken into account.
The pipeline connector suddenly crashed when one valve was opened on the MIC pipeline and was connected to the other pipelines. The operator was exposed to extreme chemical burns to prevent leakage. The administration of the factory ignored all these activities.
The schedule below provides the most common account of the events held at the Bhopal Plant on December 2 and 3.
December 2, 1984:
8‐9 pm: The MIC facility manager was directed to wash multiple pipes from MIC storage tanks from the phosgene to the scrubber system. The service inserts the slip bond (a solid disk) in the tube over the washing inlet. MIC workers were not informed that these slip blinds should be installed as a secure process and the slip binding was not installed. The MIC temperature in tanks was between 15 and 20°C.
9:30 pm: Water washing begins. One of the bleeder valves was blocked to prevent water from flowing out. The tubes have been collected. The plant supervisor directed the cleaning to proceed until a leak insulation valve was passed in the cleaning lines and into the relief valve tube 20 meters above the ground.
11 pm: The operator found in the control room that the pressure gauge attached to the E610 tank increased from 2 psi to 10 psi. The pressure rise did not trigger problems for the operator as 10 psi is within the usual range of 2-25 psi. However, the temperature of the tank in the control room was not controlled.
11.30 pm: The local staff saw the scent of MIC and observed a MIC leak close to the scrubber. They also found that the MIC and dirty water leak away from one of the valve pipes from the tank area downstream of the safety valve. The staff then set up a water spray to neutralize the leakage and people were also notified in the control room. circumstance and the actions they have taken.
December 3, 1984:
12.15‐12:30 am: The operator of the control room found that the indicator Tank E610 reads 25-30 psi. At around 12.30 a.m., the control room operator observed a maximum pressure of 55 psi for the same tank. He pointed out that one of the safety valves emerged, and the clouds of deadly gas were released from the stacking ventilator and rapidly spread through Bhopal.
12.40 am: The on-site and external toxic gas is switched to sirens by the supervisor. The operators also turned on the firewater sprayer. However, the water did not penetrate the gas cloud at the top of the scrubber pile. Furthermore, the cooling system failed to cool the tank because the Freon was depleted.
1 am: The plant manager noticed that the replacement tank E619 was not empty too. As a result, the pressure in E610 could not be decreased bypassing any MIC into E619. Outside the plant the scent of gas was noticeable.
1.30 am: Bhopal Police Chief was informed of the leak; no major police movement was followed.
8 am: Madhya Pradesh Governor ordered the closure of the plant and the arrest of the plant manager and 4 other employees.
Causes of the Release:-
A thorough review of the accident revealed that plant safety monitoring is poor. “The catastrophe at the facility was caused by poor zoning and industrial locations, poor emergency management procedures, and poor safety regulatory frameworks. ” There were three mistakes: rough, human, and machine errors. The cause of the disaster releases
The industry was advised that pipelines should be cleaned with water without blind insulation plates. The washing normally happens after a slip blind is placed next to the valve and the remainder of the system is closed. For hydro test piping, slip blinds are also used. The machines or tubing shall be isolated to ensure a safe working condition during the maintenance of machinery or piping. For this intention and due to poor maintenance, workers believe the water enters the MIC tank by accident. Since MIC polymerizes quickly, phosgene is added during MIC storage to guard against polymerization. With phosgene and hydrochloric acid, the polymerization catalyst of MIC, the water reacted in the MIC tank. The atmosphere has contributed to the reaction by helping intensify the reaction at high temperatures, containments, and other influences.
It was responded at 200°C and 180 PSIG, which allowed the scrubber to release a large number of toxic gasses. When non-stainless pipeline corrosion causes iron, the reaction increases, and increases. MIC polymerization is also catalyzed by ferric ions. Polymerization was caused by the MIC water reaction, which is an exothermic reaction and catalyzed by the presence of Ferro- ion and hydrochloric acid. None of the staff understood the flight reactions between the water and MIC in the holding tank. Accordingly, no actual rescue actions were taken. “The bad structural design was another important cause. The vent gas scrubber has been designed for a flow rate of 88 kilograms per hour. The current flow rate during the accident was however 20,000 Kg/hr.” Furthermore, the storage systems are designed to move 5 tons a day. However, three holding tanks and 55 tons of MIC were saved.
The broad storage without an appropriate defensive device was a very difficult mistake. Most protection systems did not work and many valves were in poor condition. For more than a month, the MIC (610) tank pressure control valve did not work. For the MIC relief valve, the pressure gauge was just 10 psi and the actual pressure value was more than 40 psi. The cooler machine (30 tons) kept the MIC cold below 5°C. But it was shut down and the MIC was held at room temperature. Another critical reason behind the Bhopal gas disaster was that the temperature sensor for the MIC storage tank did not survive for nearly four years. The day-to-day temperature recording was also not completed in the log sheets. This aspect was not important, as some officials said, but it should have warned us of the slippery reaction much sooner.
The user was unable to detect water intrusion into the MIC tank. It took him more than an hour to understand the reaction of the tank. The operator even missed the increase from 3 psi to 10 psi which was not seen as a significant concern. While the transition happened, the former operator did not inform the new operator of high pressure; it led to a coordination error between employees.
Despite previous accidents and pre-tragedy alerts, it was improperly investigated and recorded by the Union Carbide Industry. No uniform procedures to improve safety regulations have been enforced. Furthermore, insufficient operational protocols did not monitor the valve status if the MIC tank was not pressurized. There was no empty tank for the MIC evaluation and the operator did not trigger the vent gas scrubber.
The publication of the MIC in The Bhopal Disaster Unfolding was:
At the time of the accident, the vent gas scrubber was not operated.
Since 25 November 1984, when this accident was finished, the flare tower has been under
restoration and maintenance. Work should have been finished within 8 hours, but because of the
Members of the fire and rescue service (emergency squad) were not eligible to tackle this crash.
There was no night shift maintenance boss.
Leak Development and Gas Dispersion
As reported, the entry of water into tank 610 triggered a strong reaction. “The tank was fed by crossing the valve 1 and valve 2, valve 3, and blowing down DMV 4, and valve via the jumper lines.6 Water reacted with phosgene and formed MIC-polymerisation catalyst hydrochloric acid.
The reaction was accelerated by the iron caused by corrosion of non-stainless steel pipelines. The MIC flowed from the tank to the atmosphere along the same water direction and then via the valve ventilation header (RVVH). This incident explicitly shows that jumper line, bleeder leakage, and DMV leakage are the principal causes of the crash. If PVH and RVVH are attached via the jumper thread the water is not drained into the tank. If MIC tank 610 has not been pressurized, then DMV for blow-down could have been checked and replaced.
The methylisocyanate gas fog, their decomposition products, and reaction products have begun to scatter near the Union Carbide sector in nearby regions. Many people have begun to feel scattered. Some 12,000 people had gone to Hamidia Hospital in the early hours of 3 December 1984. In addition, residents close to the plant have been killed by MIC exposure and its decomposition products. That’s not the only event, but also on the night of 3 December and in early hours of 4 December 1984 the MIC cloud was rearranged around the area. Another 55,000 patients arrived at the local hospital. Official figures indicate that about 2500 people have been killed.
Emergency Planning and Response:
While different reasons contribute to the Bhopal disaster, it is universally agreed that plans, practices, and operations in emergency premises are below general standards. The Union Carbide Industry lacked safety devices automatically regulated. The plant was heavily based on manual control machinery. In the case of toxic plants of comparable scale, alarm devices and sensors to track leakage may often be connected to a telecommunications system. Also, emergency response steps were not taken in Bhopal and the local authorities were not aware of the dangers of the MIC.
Emergency preparation can incorporate municipal and emergency services. In addition, a dump tank of 30 000 gallons should be kept dry and ready to accept any MIC. The reduction in employment to half between 1980 and 1984 and the period of protective training for workers from 6 months to 15 days was both a significant drawback.
The nature and reaction to any chemical toxic releases were among the lessons learned from the incident. The United States passed the law in 1986 to plan and design complex chemical release emergency response operations. This Act calls for emergency preparedness, an emergency release warning, hazardous chemical supply reporting requirements, and a stock of hazardous chemical releases.
The death toll in some impacted areas hit 20 per thousand within the first two days after the disaster. The death rate was up to 24 per thousand in December 1984, compared with the national average of 1 per thousand simultaneously. The highest death rate in the 5-year age group was 33 per 1000, followed by 15% in both the 15-40- and 45-year age groups. While not all of the dead bodies were immediately discovered, on 3 December some 311 bodies were received, followed by 250 bodies on 4 December 1984.8 The estimated number of deaths since the disaster in December 1984 was 837. After 1 week of the crash, more than 2500 of the more than 200,000 gas exposed deaths were observed. In November 1989, the Madhya Pradesh Government Department of Relief and Rehabilitation had put a deadline of 3,598, and in 1994 it was expected to be 6,000.
Extreme pain and eye blindness are caused by MIC penetration. Some of the symptoms are scratching and throat and eyes coughing. ‘Furthermore, several types of neurological issues, including different degrees of anxiety, depression, musculoskeletal problems, and Gynecological problems have been triggered by air diseases, such as persistent bronchitis, emphysema, eye conditions, chronic conjunctivitis, early cataracts, and neurology, including the motor and memory. It has been estimated that children born in Bhopal were twice as likely to die in other regions after the disaster.
Operational and safety failures:
The following is a list of failures before the incident in the Union Carbide factory.
MIC preservation for a time longer than allowable.
Chloroform was not separated from MIC before storage, which played an important role in the rush reaction.
Detection and alarm devices that are not or are not working.
Temperature and pressure gauges were severely deficient in different parts of the plant and were commonly ignored by workers.
Insufficient and untrained workers
a. Faulty pipe cleaning.
b. Storage polluted with MIC.
The failure of Union Carbide to react to defects and shortcomings has been stated earlier.
MIC cooling unit shutdown.
Caustic device shutdown of soda spray.
Out of order, Flare towers.
Overwhelming tank MIC.
Any excess MIC was used in an emergency tank in the absence of a tank to redirect MIC from the main tank.
Misinformation on MIC and adverse effects of medication.
No valves to keep water from entering the tank
Deficient protective equipment:
a) Vent gas scrubber lacked sodium hydroxide to neutralize the gasses. In addition, the high pressure reached during the disaster was not handled.
b) Pipes leading to the flare turret have been removed for maintenance and cannot be used for exhaust gas burning.
c) Could not use water curtains around the plant because the pressure was not adequate to meet the release height.
d) Coolant lack in the MIC tank refrigerator.
Union Carbide said that MIC was “a mild irritant of the throat and ear.”
Sloppy protection procedures.
Failure to handle activities of the general factory.
Investment in plant safety.
Reduction of costs:
Employee preparation and maintenance have been cut significantly.
Less paying workers replaced professional employees.
Carbon Steel was replaced by valves and pipes in stainless steel.
No on-site emergency plan.
In a densely populated city, the plant is situated.
Haphazard neighborhood urbanization.
Acceptance of the plant without any security review by the Indian Government for political purposes.
Failure by the Indian government to recognize risks and mandate safety standards.
The lack of written manuals/guidelines for employee reference.
For both technological and general operations, management has not implemented data logging.
The International Medical Commission
The victims did not receive appropriate health assistance after the disaster. The company engaged in court proceedings and was about to close down. The Indian Government, on the other hand, faced the wrath of the victims’ families and others across India about their lack of investigation and the provision of medical assistance to the victims.
For patients to be handled appropriately, medical professionals wanted to know the precise cause of the disaster. They may begin their activity based on the cause. The cause of the accident had to be related to the accident’s health characteristics. In 1992, the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal proposed the establishment of a global commission to offer the victims of the Bhopal tragedy better medical treatment. The Bhopal Information and Action Group subsequently submitted a proposal in 1993.’
In 1993 the International Medical Commission for Bhopal (IMCB) was set up to provide medical care to survivors of the 1984 Bhopal tragedy. IMCB consisted of 15 experts from 12 countries with experience in the field of:
Health for the environment
Dr. Rosalie Bertell and Gianni Tognoni were co-chairmen of the IMCB. The key goal of the International Medical Commission on Bhopal was to provide relief to victims and to recommend ways to avoid these disasters in the future.
The work has been divided into eight areas:
Analysis of accidents.
Review of literature published
A plan to investigate the actual cause of the exposure was drawn up. There are three phases to this plan.
The first phase — At this point, the symptom report was analyzed and the distance used to replace the exposure. It claimed that respiratory and neurological disorders were caused by the health of exposure.
Second stage — Lung function and respiratory organs have been assessed. The study suggests that there were excessive respiratory problems and the working capacity of the lung decreased every minute. It was found that exposure needs to be analyzed carefully to assess the exact degree of risk factors involved. They also had to know exactly what they were doing to provide long-term care and medical assistance.
Third Phase — This was the last stage of the process. Victims were assessed individually based on exposure time, position and distance during this process. Finally, the study was contrasted with the findings of the distance substitution to assess if their relationship is superior to distance alone.
Attributed gas exposure diseases
The diseases attributed to gas exposure are as follows:
Ophthalmic problems — The eyes of the people have been irritated by the MIC gas. MIC gas caused burning, watering and photography, eye redness, and eyelid swelling.
Respiratory and pulmonary problems — MIC gas inhalation resulted in breath shortage, suffocation, and chest pain. Examination showed that some victims have had necrotic lesions in their respiratory organs.
Reproductivity Toxicity — Gas leaks have been high-risk factors to the fetus and not only a gas leak which has increased the risk but also factors such as maternal stress and drug intake.
Genotoxicity — The genetic information of the victims within their cells, which had increased their chance of cancer, was affected by MIC gas.
Neuromuscular toxicity — Neuromuscular symptoms such as numbness, pain, aches, and needle sensation were observed by the survivors of the accident
Other health concerns such as cancer, immunotoxicity, psychological and neurobehavioral toxicity were suffered.
Many cases on behalf of the plaintiffs were brought after the crash as justice is disturbing since many persons, in particular people of poor financial standing, were unable for a long time to contest the case. These cases were filed against UCC in Bhopal and the USA. There was also an effort outside of the case to address the issue, but it was not successful.
After some time the Bhopal Gas Leak Tragedy Act of 1985 was passed by the Indian Parliament. The Indian government was empowered to file cases for any person allowed under Section 3 of the Act to claim compensation. Section 9 of the Act followed the 1985 Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Structure.
The Indian Government brought a lawsuit against UCC at the United States District Court in New York. But the UCC argued that the hearing was inconvenient at an American Court. You became uncomfortable with the forum (it means that the Court can refuse to take jurisdiction when the parties have more convenient forums to go to). UCC said that the prosecution of the Indian courts should only be made more comfortable by the Bhopal crash. This is Keenon J. The UCC appeal was accepted and a new petition was filed before the District Court of Bhopal.
The UCC was ordered by the District Court to pay the victims a sum of Rs 350 crore. Next, UCC lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Bhopal District Court at the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The interim compensation decreased from Rs 350 crore to Rs 250 crore.11 At the same time, UCC sought to address the problem outside the court with the gas victims. M.W. Deo. Bhopal District Court however issued a provisional order to the UCC not to enter any settlement of the victims until further orders were issued.
The Court holds UCC to be liable for the Bhopal disaster after expanding the full liability rule. Though people doubted it could not be done by the Indian judiciary. They hoped the wrongdoers would escape their liability, but that was not the case. The Indian Judiciary gave the plaintiffs equal justice.
Union Carbide Corporation Supreme Court c. On 14 and 15 February 1989, the Union of India directed UCC to pay the victims 470 million dollars. (Rs 750 pillars).
Principle of Absolute Liability
This responsibility is often known to be ‘no-fault accountability.’
The accused party shall be held to account for full guilt, but not exempt from the duty. An individual can only be held liable for a men’s rea so a person may be held accountable whether he or she has full responsibilities even though he or she is not likely to commit the crime.
Strict liability is the same as the general definition of a liability. If an entity has a strict obligation, he holds with him something dangerous and he knows that even the least mistake is the one that allows people to die. He will be held solely accountable even though he has taken proper diligence and care but still prevents a man’s death.
The strict and completely separate obligation is just at one point. While a person is purely responsible, he can avoid liability, on the one hand, but on the other, they are not entirely available.
Rylands versus Fletcher
This doctrine of strict liability was laid down by Justice Blackburn in Rylands v. Fletcher12
The defendant paid the contractor for a reservoir on his territory.
The contractor discovered old coal shafts in the ground during their work.
They decided to do nothing and continued their work.
The defendant knew nothing about it.
The water broke up later when the tank was filled with water, and the water began to burst out
of the tank.
The neighbor’s mine was flooded as a result.
The intimate (neighbor) then sued and claimed damages against the defendant.
In this case, the House of the Lords proposed the Strict Liability Doctrine that he would be responsible for it even though the accused did not intend to hurt anyone. This is because of his mistake.
The words used by Blackburn J are below. Proposing the rule:
“We think that the rule of law is, that the person who for his purposes brings on his lands and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff’s default; or perhaps that the escape was the consequence of vis major or the act of God: but as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient.
Another essential characteristic of Strict Liability is that the implementation of this law does not
include natural land use.
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India
The Doctrine of Absolute Liability was introduced in this case by P.N. Bhagwati J
Delhi Cloth Mills Ltd’s defendant, Shri Ram Food and Fertilizer Industry produced hazardous
M.C. Mehta had already filed cases against the industry calling for the closure of this industry’s units.
Oleum gas leaked from one unit of the industry on December 4.
Many people died in this accident, including a lawyer practicing at the Tis Hazari Court.
The leakage is thought to have been caused by mechanical and human errors.
There was another minor oleum gas leakage from the connecting pipes even two days after the accident.
Shriram industry was ordered by the District Court to stop their production of deadly gasses and chemicals.
M.C. Mehta under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL).
This was the second instance of poisonous gas leakage from Union Carbide in Bhopal following the leakage of MIC gas within one year. The Supreme Court knew that the industries engaged in hazardous work would escape responsibility by exempting from the rule of the strict article if they implemented the Strict Liability Doctrine established in the case Rylands v. Fletcher.
Consequently, the Apex Court agreed to adopt a new law to align Indian circumstances. It laid down that there were no exceptions for an individual under strict obligation. In compliance with the law of total liability, the court found the defendant responsible.
The Court held that the petitioners could seek compensation on behalf of the victims, following an action taken in the appropriate court.
Although the Court justified the decision, two reasons were given:
An company knows everything about its commodity processing activities. The industry therefore must-have resources and protections in case of risk.
If an industry is engaged in a risky or unsafe sector for profit, it must be covered by public duty. Therefore, it must reimburse the sufferers in the case of an accident.
C.J. Bhagwati The new principal made the following statement while laying down:
We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous activity which it has undertaken. The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results on account of such activity, the enterprise must be absolutely liable to compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without any negligence on its part.
The Court gave the following statement as well:
“Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting, for example, in the escape of toxic gas, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher.
Enactment of Acts
In Bhopal, people continue to be affected, particularly close to the factory, even after several years of the accident. The consequence of the crash has still not escaped. And today, children born have a form of problem with injuries.
The Government has decided to apply laws that protect the atmosphere to prevent possible environmental risks caused by human activities. Laws to ensure that a timely hearing takes place in the event of a confrontation.
The 1986 Act on Environmental Protection
After two years of the Bhopal tragedy, the Environmental Conservation Act was passed in 1986. The Act’s primary aim is to protect the atmosphere and deter future threats. It is said to be launched at the UN Human Environment Meeting in Stockholm in June 1972.
Five chapters and 26 pages are contained in the Act. It addresses eco, human, plant, and animal protection and eliminates future risks like the Bhopal tragedy.
This legislation is also called umbrella law since the Union and the State are coordinated with other laws, such as the Water Law and the Air Law.
Act 2010 of the National Green Tribunal
This Act provides for swift analysis of environmental events. This Act shall extend in the case of a breach of environmental or civil rights safeguards against the use of hazardous chemicals. The Act’s main goal is to ensure that cases are settled quickly.
This Act contains 5 chapters and 38 sections. This is provided for in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which lays down the “Right to a healthy environment.
Law of the Factories
The Factories Act of 1948 was enacted before the Bhopal disaster. However, the provisions of this Act favor workers engaged in factories, industries, and mines.” This Act has as main objective the safeguarding of workers, the improvement of working conditions for employees, and the creation of special arrangements for women and children working in factories.
Public Responsibility Insurance Act, 1991
An individual may sue for relief in the event of an accident arising from the preservation of any dangerous chemicals under the Public Liability Insurance Act 1991. “The Act provides for insurance of public liability. This Act is based on “Liability for No-Fault.” This means that, regardless of his treatment, the individual is liable for compensating others to avoid an accident.
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution extended
In compliance with Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, everyone has the right to life and freedom. An individual cannot be granted this privilege until a court order is issued. This essay is considered a ‘mini-constitution.’ It includes a variety of other rights, including anonymity, shelter, and information rights. Article 21 has repeatedly been enlarged and raised in size by the Supreme Court of India by providing a right to a clean and stable environment.
In Subhash Kumar v. the State of Bihar, the Supreme Court held that Indians have an important right to live in a free pollution atmosphere for full enjoyment of life. This also compelled local authorities to take action in their areas to reduce the rate of pollution.
The Supreme Court admitted the Public Interest Litigation under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution in Rural Litigation and Environment Kendra, Dehradun v. State Uttar Pradesh and ordered some limestone quarries to close their quarries. It was found that only certain cars that are suitable for service and have fewer negative effects can do their job. The fitness of a quarry was determined after an inspection.
At first, no environmental protection protections existed, but the Supreme Court accepted and adopted environmental protection as a fundamental right over time. The Indian Constitution includes other clauses that direct the State and the people to protect the environment. Concerning Articles 39(b), 47, 48, 49, 48A, and 51A, these rules shall apply.
Under section 15(1) of the Environmental Protection Act 1986, a person who contravenes any of the provisions of the Environmental Protection Act is liable for up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine of one or both lakhs. “And in cases when the offender continues to violate the Act, every day from the date of conviction until he stops the violation, he must pay an extra penalty of Rs 5000.
Article 15(2) states that if the offense lasts for more than one year, he can be disciplined for up to seven years in jail.
Introduction of new rules of procedure
Hazardous Regulations, 2008
Under the 1986 Environmental Protection Act, the 1989 Regulations for Hazardous Wastes (Management and Handling) were enacted. It was subsequently amended in 2000 and then 2003.
In 2008, the 2008 Hazardous Waste Statute repealed 1989 Hazardous Waste and its amendments.
The Hazardous Waste Regulations (2008) deal with the proper handling of care, collection, and recycling of ‘hazardous wastes.’ Annexes 1, 2, and 3 are grouped into different types of radioactive waste. Under this statute, the definition of hazardous waste shall not include exhaust gasses, biomedical waste, or wastewater.
Regulations for chemical accidents 1996
During the manufacturing process of various goods, many hazardous chemicals are treated. The use of these chemicals implies a high risk in the event of disease if due care and caution are not taken. The Indian Government, therefore, adopted the Chemical Accident Rules (Emergency Preparation, Preparedness and Response) 1996 to ensure that, in an emergency, people were sure to know exactly what to do.
Under these rules, the Central Crisis Group should be formed, the State Crisis Group and District Crisis Group, which should deal with chemical malfunctions and provide guidance on the subject. The 1996 Chemical Accident Regulations also applied to a list of harmful chemicals.
India is a developing world and is thus willing to induce foreign investments to expand economically. Industrialization is marketed to globalization. We should not lose sight of the long-term effect on the environment and human wellbeing of these industries. India must be stringent if the legislation is to be enforced to keep us from re-paying this high price. UCIL got rid of these flagrant offenses because the laws were too lax to discourage. No matter what the years, the horrific Bhopal tragedy is still visible today. Particularly after the UCC has been held accountable, the loss of those who have lost their lives and still suffer is impossible to measure. If the government wants to facilitate globalization, it should ensure that there are no threats involved. Moreover, it is time for the law to be applied in the right way because nothing is more critical than citizens’ lives.
Are human lives in India too poised for a miserable accident? Everything necessary is for those left behind to lead a healthy life and to face death. There can’t be replaced the thousands of lives lost. The industrial tragedy has led to a change in the view of the climate, environment, justice, and human rights. The government and the general population felt forced to fix these issues with the utmost priority.
The disaster of Bhopal triggered shock waves in the chemical sector and resulted in significant changes and stressed process safety, technically and managerially, with both human heart failure and utter technological incompetence. Maybe it’s too late to find out who was behind such a drama, for our poverty book includes yet another chapter in the balance of influence between the poor and the major multinationals. It is critical, however, that the tragedy is investigated and all failures are addressed. This has been achieved successfully by the pharmaceutical industry in recent decades.
I. Union Carbide and the Devastation of Bhopal by R Mokhiber.
II. The Bhopal Disaster of 1984 by R.V Varma.
II. HEALTH EFFECTS OF THE TOXIC GAS LEAK FROM UNION CARBIDE METHYL ISOCYANATE PLANT IN BHOPAL by S. Shriramachari.
IV. Bhopal Gas Tragedy: A Revisit to pick out some lessons we have forgotten in 28 years by S. Singh.
V. Progress and Challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction by UNISDR.
VI. Bhopal gas Tragedy: A safety case study by O. Basha.
VII. The unfolding of the Bhopal disaster. Loss Prevention in the Process Industries by T. Chauhan.
VIII. The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review by E. Broughton.
IX. The Union Carbide Disaster in Bhopal: A Review of Health Effects. Archives of Environmental Health by R. Dhara.
X. The Ethics of Industrial Disasters in a Transnational World: The Elusive Quest for Justice and Accountability in Bhopal by W. Morehouse.
XI. Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act, 1985.
XII. Bhopal gas tragedy: High Court awards interim relief of Rs 250 crore to victims by N.K. Singh.
XIII. Rylands v. Fletcher 1868.
XIV. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1987.
XV. National Green Tribunal Act, 2010.
XVI. Factories Act, 1948.
XVII. Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991.
I have always been against Glorifying Over Work and therefore, in the year 2021, I have decided to launch this campaign “Balancing Life”and talk about this wrong practice, that we have been following since last few years. I will be talking to and interviewing around 1 lakh people in the coming 2021 and publish their interview regarding their opinion on glamourising Over Work.
If you are interested in participating in the same, do let me know.
The copyright of this Article belongs exclusively to Ms. Aishwarya Sandeep. Reproduction of the same, without permission will amount to Copyright Infringement. Appropriate Legal Action under the Indian Laws will be taken.
If you would also like to contribute to my website, then do share your articles or poems at email@example.com
We also have a Facebook Group Restarter Moms for Mothers or Women who would like to rejoin their careers post a career break or women who are enterpreneurs.